Shia Islam in Iran
Distinctive Beliefs
Although Shias have lived in Iran since the earliest days of Islam,
and there was one Shia dynasty in part of Iran during the tenth and eleventh
centuries, it is believed that most Iranians were Sunnis until the seventeenth
century. The Safavid dynasty made Shia Islam the official state religion
in the sixteenth century and aggressively proselytized on its behalf. It
is also believed that by the mid-seventeenth century most people in what
is now Iran had become Shias, an affiliation that has continued.
All Shia Muslims believe there are seven pillars of faith, which detail
the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce faith. The first five of
these pillars are shared with Sunni Muslims. They are shahada, or the confession
of faith; namaz, or ritualized prayer; zakat, or almsgiving; sawm, fasting
and contemplation during daylight hours during the lunar month of Ramazan;
and hajj, or pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina once in
a lifetime if financially feasible. The other two pillars, which are not
shared with Sunnis, are jihad -- or crusade to protect Islamic lands, beliefs,
and institutions, and the requirement to do good works and to avoid all
evil thoughts, words, and deeds.
Twelver Shia Muslims also believe in five basic principles of faith:
there is one God, who is a unitary divine being in contrast to the trinitarian
being of Christians; the Prophet Muhammad is the last of a line of prophets
beginning with Abraham and including Moses and Jesus, and he was chosen
by God to present His message to mankind; there is a resurrection of the
body and soul on the last or judgment day; divine justice will reward or
punish believers based on actions undertaken through their own free will;
and Twelve Imams were successors to Muhammad. The first three of these
beliefs are also shared by non- Twelver Shias and Sunni Muslims.
The distinctive dogma and institution of Shia Islam is the Imamate,
which includes the idea that the successor of Muhammad be more than merely
a political leader. The Imam must also be a spiritual leader, which means
that he must have the ability to interpret the inner mysteries of the Quran
and the shariat. The Twelver Shias
further believe that the Twelve Imams who succeeded the Prophet were sinless
and free from error and had been chosen by God through Muhammad.
The Imamate began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni Muslims as
the fourth of the "rightly guided caliphs" to succeed the Prophet. Shias
revere Ali as the First Imam, and his descendants, beginning with his sons
Hasan and Husayn (also seen as Hosein), continue the line of the Imams
until the Twelfth, who is believed to have ascended into a supernatural
state to return to earth on judgment day. Shias point to the close lifetime
association of Muhammad with Ali. When Ali was six years old, he was invited
by the Prophet to live with him, and Shias believe Ali was the first person
to make the declaration of faith in Islam. Ali also slept in Muhammad's
bed on the night of the hijra, or migration from Mecca to Medina, when
it was feared that the house would be attacked by unbelievers and the Prophet
stabbed to death. He fought in all the battles Muhammad did except one,
and the Prophet chose him to be the husband of his favorite daughter, Fatima.
In Sunni Islam an imam is the leader of congregational prayer. Among
the Shias of Iran the term imam traditionally has been used only for Ali
and his eleven descendants. None of the Twelve Imams, with the exception
of Ali, ever ruled an Islamic government. During their lifetimes, their
followers hoped that they would assume the rulership of the Islamic community,
a rule that was believed to have been wrongfully usurped. Because the Sunni
caliphs were cognizant of this hope, the Imams generally were persecuted
during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. Therefore, the Imams tried to
be as unobtrusive as possible and to live as far as was reasonable from
the successive capitals of the Islamic empire.
During the ninth century Caliph Al Mamun, son of Caliph Harun ar Rashid,
was favorably disposed toward the descendants of Ali and their followers.
He invited the Eighth Imam, Reza (A.D. 765-816), to come from Medina to
his court at Marv (Mary in the present-day Soviet Union). While Reza was
residing at Marv, Mamun designated him as his successor in an apparent
effort to avoid conflict among Muslims. Reza's sister Fatima journeyed
from Medina to be with her brother but took ill and died at Qom. A shrine
developed around her tomb, and over the centuries Qom has become a major
Shia pilgrimage and theology center.
Mamun took Reza on his military campaign to retake Baghdad from political
rivals. On this trip Reza died unexpectedly in Khorasan. Reza was the only
Imam to reside or die in what is now Iran. A major shrine, and eventually
the city of Mashhad, grew up around his tomb, which has become the most
important pilgrimage center in Iran. Several important theological schools
are located in Mashhad, associated with the shrine of the Eighth Imam.
Reza's sudden death was a shock to his followers, many of whom believed
that Mamun, out of jealousy for Reza's increasing popularity, had him poisoned.
Mamun's suspected treachery against Reza and his family tended to reinforce
a feeling already prevalent among his followers that the Sunni rulers were
untrustworthy.
The Twelfth Imam is believed to have been only five years old when the
Imamate descended upon him in A.D. 874 at the death of his father. The
Twelfth Imam is usually known by his titles of Imam-e Asr (the Imam of
the Age) and Sahib az Zaman (the Lord of Time). Because his followers feared
he might be assassinated, the Twelfth Imam was hidden from public view
and was seen only by a few of his closest deputies. Sunnis claim that he
never existed or that he died while still a child. Shias believe that the
Twelfth Imam remained on earth, but hidden from the public, for about seventy
years, a period they refer to as the lesser occultation (gheybat-e sughra).
Shias also believe that the Twelfth Imam has never died, but disappeared
from earth in about A.D. 939. Since that time the greater occultation (gheybat-e
kubra) of the Twelfth Imam has been in force and will last until God commands
the Twelfth Imam to manifest himself on earth again as the Mahdi, or Messiah.
Shias believe that during the greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam he
is spiritually present -- some believe that he is materially present as
well -- and he is besought
to reappear in various invocations and prayers. His name is mentioned
in wedding invitations, and his birthday is one of the most jubilant of
all Shia religious observances.
The Shia doctrine of the Imamate was not fully elaborated until the
tenth century. Other dogmas were developed still later. A characteristic
of Shia Islam is the continual exposition and reinterpretation of doctrine.
The most recent example is Khomeini's expounding of the doctrine of velayat-e
faqih, or the political guardianship of the community of believers
by scholars trained in religious law. This has not been a traditional idea
in Shia Islam and is, in fact, an innovation. The basic idea is that the
clergy, by virtue of their superior knowledge of the laws of God, are the
best qualified to rule the society of believers who are preparing themselves
on earth to live eternally in heaven. The concept of velayat-e faqih thus
provides the doctrinal basis for theocratic government, an experiment that
Twelver Imam Shias had not attempted prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Religious Obligations
In addition to the seven principal tenets of faith, there are also traditional
religious practices that are intimately associated with Shia Islam. These
include the observance of the month of martyrdom, Moharram, and pilgrimages
to the shrines of the Twelve Imams and their various descendants. The Moharram
observances commemorate the death of the Third Imam, Husayn, who was the
son of Ali and Fatima and the grandson of Muhammad. He was killed near
Karbala in modern Iraq in A.D. 680 during a battle with troops supporting
the Umayyad caliph. Husayn's death is commemorated by Shias with passion
plays and is an intensely religious time.
Pilgrimage to the shrines of Imams is a specific Shia custom. The most
important shrines in Iran are those for the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and
for his sister Fatima in Qom. There are also important secondary shrines
for other relatives of the Eighth Iman in Rey, adjacent to south Tehran,
and in Shiraz. In virtually all towns and in many villages there are numerous
lesser shrines, known as imamzadehs, which commemorate descendants of the
imams who are reputed to have led saintly lives. Shia pilgrims visit these
sites because they believe that the imams and their relatives have power
to intercede with God on behalf of petitioners. The shrines in Iraq at
Karbala and An Najaf are also revered by Shias.
Religious Institutions and Organizations
A prayer meeting at the University of Theran
Historically, the single most important religious institution in Iran
has been the mosque. In towns, congregational prayers, as well as prayers
and rites associated with religious observances and important phases in
the lives of Muslims, took place in mosques. Iranian Shias before the Revolution
did not generally attach great significance to institutionalization, however,
and there was little emphasis on mosque attendance, even for the Friday
congregational prayers. Mosques were primarily an urban phenomenon, and
in most of the thousands of small villages there were no mosques. Mosques
in the larger cities began to assume more important social roles during
the 1970s; during the Revolution they played a prominent role in organizing
people for the large demonstrations that took place in 1978 and 1979. Since
that time their role has continued to expand, so that in 1987 mosques played
important political and social roles as well as religious ones.
Another religious institution of major significance was a special building
known as a hoseiniyeh. Hoseiniyehs existed in urban areas and traditionally
served as sites for recitals commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn, especially
during the month of Moharram. In the 1970s, some hoseiniyehs, such as the
Hoseiniyeh Irshad in Tehran, became politicized as prominent clerical and
lay preachers used the symbol of the deaths as martyrs of Husayn and the
other Imams as thinly veiled criticism of Mohammad Reza Shah's regime,
thus helping to lay the groundwork for the Revolution in 1979.
Institutions providing religious education include madrasehs and maktabs.
Madrasehs, or seminaries, historically have been important for advanced
training in Shia theology and jurisprudence. Madrasehs are generally associated
with noted Shia scholars who have attained the rank of ayatollah. There
are also some older madrasehs, established initially through endowments,
at which several scholars may teach. Students, known as talabehs, live
on the grounds of the madrasehs and are provided stipends for the duration
of their studies, usually a minimum of seven years, during which they prepare
for the examinations that qualify a seminary student to be a low-level
preacher, or mullah. At the time of the Revolution, there were slightly
more than 11,000 talabehs in Iran; approximately 60 percent of these were
studying at the madrasehs in the city of Qom, another 25 percent were enrolled
in the important madrasehs of Mashhad and Esfahan, and the rest were at
madrasehs in Tabriz, Yazd, Shiraz, Tehran, Zanjan, and other cities.
Maktabs, primary schools run by the clergy, were the only educational
institutions prior to the end of the nineteenth century when the first
secular schools were established. Maktabs declined in numbers and importance
as the government developed a national public school system beginning in
the 1930s. Nevertheless, maktabs continued to exist as private religious
schools right up to the Revolution. Since 1979 the public education system
has been desecularized and the maktabs and their essentially religious
curricula merged with government schools.
Another major religious institution in Iran is the shrine. There are
more than 1,100 shrines that vary from crumbling sites associated with
local saints to the imposing shrines of Imam Reza and his sister Fatima
in Mashhad and Qom, respectively. These more famous shrines are huge complexes
that include the mausoleums of the venerated Eighth Imam and his sister,
tombs of former shahs, mosques, madrasehs, and libraries. Imam Reza's shrine
is the largest and is considered to be the holiest. In addition to the
usual shrine accoutrements, Imam Reza's shrine contains hospitals, dispensaries,
a museum, and several mosques located in a series of courtyards surrounding
his tomb. Most of the present shrine dates from the early fourteenth century,
except for the dome, which was rebuilt after being damaged in an earthquake
in 1673. The shrine's endowments and gifts are the largest of all religious
institutions in the country. Traditionally, free meals for as many as 1,000
people per day are provided at the shrine. Although there are no special
times for visiting this or other shrines, it is customary for pilgrimage
traffic to be heaviest during Shia holy periods. It has been estimated
that more than 3 million pilgrims visit the shrine annually.
Visitors to Imam Reza's shrine represent all socioeconomic levels. Whereas
piety is a motivation for many, others come to seek the spiritual grace
or general good fortune that a visit to the shrine is believed to ensure.
Commonly a pilgrimage is undertaken to petition Imam Reza to act as an
intermediary between the pilgrim and God. Since the nineteenth century,
it has been customary among the bazaar class and members of the lower classes
to recognize those who have made a pilgrimage to Mashhad by prefixing their
names with the title mashti.
The next most important shrine is that of Imam Reza's sister, Fatima,
known as Hazarat-e Masumeh (the Pure Saint). The present shrine dates from
the early sixteenth century, although some later additions, including the
gilded tiles, were affixed in the early nineteenth century. Other important
shrines are those of Shah Abdol Azim, a relative of Imam Reza, who is entombed
at Rey, near Tehran, and Shah Cheragh, a brother of Imam Reza, who is buried
in Shiraz. A leading shrine honoring a person not belonging to the family
of Imams is that of the Sufi master Sayyid Nimatollah Vali near Kerman.
Shias make pilgrimages to these shrines and the hundreds of local imamzadehs
to petition the saints to grant them special favors or to help them through
a period of troubles.
Because Shias believe that the holy Imams can intercede for the dead
as well as for the living, cemeteries traditionally have been located adjacent
to the most important shrines in both Iran and Iraq. Corpses were transported
overland for burial in Karbala in southern Iraq until the practice was
prohibited in the 1930s. Corpses are still shipped to Mashhad and Qom for
burial in the shrine cemeteries of these cities.
The constant movement of pilgrims from all over Iran to Mashhad and
Qom has helped bind together a linguistically heterogeneous population.
Pilgrims serve as major sources of information about conditions in different
parts of the country and thus help to mitigate the parochialism of the
regions.
A traditional source of financial support for all religious institutions
has been the vaqf, a religious endowment by which land and other income-producing
property is given in perpetuity for the maintenance of a shrine, mosque,
madraseh, or charitable institution such as a hospital, library, or orphanage.
A mutavalli administers a vaqf in accordance with the stipulations in the
donor's bequest. In many vaqfs the position of mutavalli is hereditary.
Under the Pahlavis, the government attempted to exercise control over the
administration of vaqfs, especially those of the larger shrines. This was
a source of conflict with the clergy, who perceived the government's efforts
as lessening their influence and authority in traditional religious matters.
The government's interference with the administration of vaqfs led to
a sharp decline in the number of vaqf bequests. Instead, wealthy and pious
Shias chose to give financial contributions directly to the leading ayatollahs
in the form of zakat, or obligatory alms. The clergy in turn used the funds
to administer their madrasehs and to institute various educational and
charitable programs, which indirectly provided them with more influence
in society. The access of the clergy to a steady and independent source
of funding was an important factor in their ability to resist state controls
and ultimately helped them direct the opposition to the shah.
Religious Hierarchy
From the time that Twelver Shia Islam emerged as a distinct religious
denomination in the early ninth century, its clergy, or ulama, have played
a prominent role in the development of its scholarly and legal tradition;
however, the development of a distinct hierarchy among the Shia clergy
dates back only to the early nineteenth century. Since that time the highest
religious authority has been vested in the mujtahids, scholars who by virtue
of their erudition in the science of religion (the Quran, the traditions
of Muhammad and the imams, jurisprudence, and theology) and their attested
ability to decide points of religious conduct, act as leaders of their
community in matters concerning the particulars of religious duties. Lay
Shias and lesser members of the clergy who lack such proficiency are expected
to follow mujtahids in all matters pertaining to religion, but each believer
is free to follow any mujtahid he chooses. Since the mid-nineteenth century
it has been common for several mujtahids concurrently to attain prominence
and to attract large followings. During the twentieth century, such mujtahids
have been accorded the title of ayatollah. Occasionally an ayatollah achieves
almost universal authority among Shias and is given the title of ayatollah
ol ozma, or grand ayatollah. Such authority was attained by as many as
seven mujtahids simultaneously, including Ayatollah Khomeini, in the late
1970s.
To become a mujtahid, it is necessary to complete a rigorous and lengthy
course of religious studies in one of the prestigious madrasehs of Qom
or Mashhad in Iran or An Najaf in Iraq and to receive an authorization
from a qualified mujtahid. Of equal importance is either the explicit or
the tacit recognition of a cleric as a mujtahid by laymen and scholars
in the Shia community. There is no set time for studying a particular subject,
but serious preparation to become a mujtahid normally requires fifteen
years to master the religious subjects deemed essential. It is uncommon
for any student to attain the status of mujtahid before the age of thirty;
more commonly students are between forty and fifty years old when they
achieve this distinction.
Most seminary students do not complete the full curriculum of studies
to become mujtahids. Those who leave the madrasehs after completing the
primary level can serve as prayer leaders, village mullahs, local shrine
administrators, and other religious functionaries. Those who leave after
completing the second level become preachers in town and city mosques.
Students in the third level of study are those preparing to become mujtahids.
The advanced students at this level are generally accorded the title of
hojjatoleslam when they have completed all their studies.
The Shia clergy in Iran wear a white turban and an aba, a loose, sleeveless
brown cloak, open in front. A sayyid, who is a clergyman descended from
Muhammad, wears a black turban and a black aba.
Unorthodox Shia Religious Movements
Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, who established Twelver
Shia Islam as the official religion of Iran at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, was revered by his followers as a Sufi master. Sufism, or Islamic
mysticism, has a long tradition in Iran. It developed there and in other
areas of the Islamic empire during the ninth century among Muslims who
believed that worldly pleasures distracted from true concern with the salvation
of the soul. Sufis generally renounced materialism, which they believed
supported and perpetuated political tyranny. Their name is derived from
the Arabic word for wool, suf, and was applied to the early Sufis because
of their habit of wearing rough wool next to their skin as a symbol of
their asceticism. Over time a great variety of Sufi brotherhoods was formed,
including several that were militaristic, such as the Safavid order, of
which Ismail was the leader.
Although Sufis were associated with the early spread of Shia ideas in
the country, once the Shia clergy had consolidated their authority over
religion by the early seventeenth century, they tended to regard Sufis
as deviant. At various periods during the past three centuries some Shia
clergy have encouraged persecution of Sufis, but Sufi orders have continued
to exist in Iran. During the Pahlavi period, some Sufi brotherhoods were
revitalized. Some members of the secularized middle class were especially
attracted to them, but the orders appear to have had little following among
the lower classes. The largest Sufi order was the Nimatollahi, which had
khanehgahs, or teaching centers, in several cities and even established
new centers in foreign countries. Other important orders were the Dhahabi
and Kharksar brotherhoods. Sufi brotherhoods such as the Naqshbandi and
the Qadiri also existed among Sunni Muslims in Kordestan. There is no evidence
of persecution of Sufis under the Republic, but the brotherhoods are regarded
suspiciously and generally have kept a low profile.
Iran also contains Shia sects that many of the Twelver Shia clergy regard
as heretical. One of these is the Ismaili, a sect that has several thousand
adherents living primarily in northeastern Iran. The Ismailis, of whom
there were once several different sects, trace their origins to the son
of Ismail who predeceased his father, the Sixth Imam. The Ismailis were
very numerous and active in Iran from the eleventh to the thirteenth century;
they are known in history as the "Assassins" because of their practice
of killing political opponents. The Mongols destroyed their center at Alamut
in the Alborz Mountains in 1256. Subsequently, their living imams went
into hiding from non-Ismailis. In the nineteenth century, their leader
emerged in public as the Agha Khan and fled to British-controlled India, where he supervised the revitalization of the sect. The majority of the several million Ismailis in the 1980s live outside Iran.
Another Shia sect is the Ahl-e Haqq. Its adherents are concentrated in Lorestan, but small communities also are found in Kordestan and Mazandaran. The origins of the Ahl-e Haqq are believed to lie in one of the medieval politicized Sufi orders. The group has been persecuted sporadically by orthodox Shias. After the Revolution, some of the sect's leaders were imprisoned on the ground of religious deviance.
Sunni Muslims
Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 8 percent of the Iranian population. A majority of Kurds, virtually all Baluchis and Turkomans, and a minority of Arabs are Sunnis, as are small communities of Persians in southern Iran and Khorasan. The main difference between Sunnis and Shias is that the former do not accept the doctrine of the Imamate. Generally speaking, Iranian Shias are inclined to recognize Sunnis as fellow Muslims, but as those whose religion is incomplete. Shia clergy tend to view missionary work among Sunnis to convert them to true Islam as a worthwhile religious endeavor. Since the Sunnis generally live in the border regions of the country, there has been no occasion for Shia-Sunni conflict in most of Iran. In those towns with mixed populations in West Azarbaijan, the Persian Gulf region, and Baluchestan va Sistan, tensions between Shias and Sunnis existed both before and after the Revolution. Religious tensions have been highest during major Shia observances, especially Moharram.
Non-Muslim Minorities
Bahais
The largest non-Muslim minority in Iran is the Bahais. There were an estimated 350,000 Bahais in Iran in 1986 (see table 4, Appendix). The Bahais are scattered in small communities throughout Iran with a heavy concentration in Tehran. Most Bahais are urban, but there are some Bahai villages, especially in Fars and Mazandaran. The majority of Bahais are Persians, but there is a significant minority of Azarbaijani Bahais, and there are even a few among the Kurds.
Bahaism is a religion that originated in Iran during the 1840s as a reformist movement within Shia Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shia clergy and others dissatisfied with society. The political and religious authorities joined to suppress the movement, and since that time the hostility of the Shia clergy to Bahaism has remained intense. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Bahai leader fled to Ottoman Palestine--roughly present-day Israel--where he and his successors continued to elaborate Bahai doctrines by incorporating beliefs from other world religions. By the early twentieth century, Bahaism had evolved into a new religion that stressed the brotherhood of all peoples, equality of the sexes, and pacifism.
The Shia clergy, as well as many Iranians, have continued to regard Bahais as heretics from Islam. Consequently, Bahais have encountered much prejudice and have sometimes been the objects of persecution. The situation of the Bahais improved under the Pahlavi shahs when the government actively sought to secularize public life. Bahais were permitted to hold government posts (despite a constitutional prohibition) and allowed to open their own schools, and many were successful in business and the professions. Their position was drastically altered after 1979. The Islamic Republic did not recognize the Bahais as a religious minority, and the sect has been officially persecuted. More than 700 of their religious leaders were arrested, and several of them were executed for apostasy; their schools were closed; their communal property was confiscated; they were prohibited from holding any government employment; and they were not issued identity cards. In addition, security forces failed to protect Bahais and their property from attacks by mobs.
Christians
Iran's indigenous Christians include an estimated 250,000 Armenians, some 32,000 Assyrians, and a small number of Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant Iranians converted by missionaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Armenians are predominantly urban and are concentrated in Tehran and Esfahan; smaller communities exist in Tabriz, Arak, and other cities. A majority of the Assyrians are also urban, although there are still several Assyrian villages in the Lake Urmia region. Armenians and Assyrians were recognized as official religious minorities under the 1906 constitution. Although Armenians and Assyrians have encountered individual prejudice, they have not been subjected to persecution. During the twentieth century, Christians in general have participated in the economic and social life of Tehran. The Armenians, especially, achieved a relatively high standard of living and maintained a large number of parochial primary and secondary schools.
The new, republican Constitution of 1979 also recognized the Armenians and Assyrians as official religious minorities (see Constitutional Framework , ch. 4). They are entitled to elect their own representatives to the Majlis and are permitted to follow their own religious laws in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Other Christians have not received any special recognition, and there have been a number of incidents of persecution of Iranian Anglicans. All Christians are required to observe the new laws relating to attire, prohibition of alcohol, and segregation by sex at public gatherings. Christians have resented these laws because they have infringed on their traditional religious practices. In addition, the administration of the Armenian schools has been a source of tension between Christians and the government. The Ministry of Education has insisted that the principals of such schools be Muslims, that all religion courses be taught in Persian, that any Armenian literature classes have government approval, and that all female students observe hejab inside the schools.
Jews
In 1986 there were an estimated 50,000 Jews in Iran, a decline from about 85,000 in 1978. The Iranian Jewish community is one of the oldest in the world, being descended from Jews who remained in the region following the Babylonian captivity, when the Achaemenid rulers of the first Iranian empire permitted Jews to return to Jerusalem. Over the centuries the Jews of Iran became physically, culturally, and linguistically indistinguishable from the non-Jewish population. The overwhelming majority of Jews speak Persian as their mother language, and a tiny minority, Kurdish. The Jews are predominantly urban and by the 1970s were concentrated in Tehran, with smaller communities in other cities, such as Shiraz, Esfahan, Hamadan, and Kashan.
Until the twentieth century the Jews were confined to their own quarters in the towns. In general the Jews were an impoverished minority, occupationally restricted to small-scale trading, moneylending, and working with precious metals. Since the 1920s, Jews have had greater opportunities for economic and social mobility. They have received assistance from a number of international Jewish organizations, including the American Joint Distribution Committee, which introduced electricity, piped water, and modern sanitation into Jewish neighborhoods. The Jews have gradually gained increased importance in the bazaars of Tehran and other cities, and after World War II some educated Jews entered the professions, particularly pharmacy, medicine, and dentistry.
The Constitution of 1979 recognized Jews as an official religious minority and accorded them the right to elect a representative to the Majlis. Like the Christians, the Jews have not been persecuted. Unlike the Christians, the Jews have been viewed with suspicion by the government, probably because of the government's intense hostility toward Israel. Iranian Jews generally have many relatives in Israel--some 45,000 Iranian Jews emigrated from Iran to Israel between 1948 and 1977--with whom they are in regular contact. Since 1979 the government has cited mail and telephone communications as evidence of "spying" in the arrest, detention, and even execution of a few prominent Jews. Although these individual cases have not affected the status of the community as a whole, they have contributed to a pervasive feeling of insecurity among Jews regarding their future in Iran and have helped to precipitate large- scale emigration. Most Jews who have left since the Revolution have settled in the United States.
Zoroastrians
In 1986 there were an estimated 32,000 Zoroastrians in Iran. They speak Persian and are concentrated in Tehran, Kerman, and Yazd. Zoroastrianism initially developed in Iran during the seventh century B.C. Later, it became the official religion of the Sassanid Empire, which ruled over Iran for approximately four centuries before being destroyed by the Arabs in the seventh century A.D. After Iran's incorporation into the Islamic empire, the majority of its population was gradually converted from Zoroastrianism to Islam, a process that was probably completed by the tenth century.
During the Qajar era there was considerable prejudice against Zoroastrians. In the mid-nineteenth century, several thousand Zoroastrians emigrated from Iran to British-ruled India to improve their economic and social status. Many eventually acquired wealth in India and subsequently expended part of their fortunes on upgrading conditions in the Zoroastrian communities of Iran. The emphasis placed on Iran's pre- Islamic heritage by the Pahlavis also helped Zoroastrians to achieve a more respected position in society. Many of them migrated from Kerman and Yazd to Tehran, where they accumulated significant wealth as merchants and in real estate. By the 1970s, younger Zoroastrians were entering the professions.
Like the Christians and Jews, the Zoroastrians are recognized as an official religious minority under the Constitution of 1979. They are permitted to elect one representative to the Majlis and, like the other legally accepted minorities, may seek employment in the government. They generally enjoy the same civil liberties as Muslims. Although Zoroastrians probably have encountered individual instances of prejudice, they have not been persecuted because of their religious beliefs.
EDUCATION
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, it was traditional in Iran for education to be associated with religious institutions. The clergy, both Shia and non-Shia, assumed responsibility for instructing youth in basic literacy and the fundamentals of religion. Knowledge of reading and writing was not considered necessary for all the population, and thus education generally was restricted to the sons of the economic and political elite. Typically, this involved a few years of study in a local school, or maktab. Those who desired to acquire more advanced knowledge could continue in a religious college, or madraseh, where all fields of religious science were taught. A perceived need to provide instruction in subjects that were not part of the traditional religious curriculum, such as accounting, European languages, military science, and technology, led to the establishment of the first government school in 1851. For many years this remained the only institution of higher learning in the country.
By the early twentieth century there were several schools teaching foreign languages and sciences, including a few for girls. These schools were run by foreign missionaries, private Iranians, and the government. Their function was to educate the children of the elite. During the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1907), a number of reform-minded individuals proposed the establishment of a nationwide, public, primary school system. Progress in opening new schools was steady but slow, and by the end of the Qajar dynasty (1925) there were approximately 3,300 government schools with a total enrollment of about 110,000 students.
During the Pahlavi era (1925-79), the government implemented a number of policies aimed at modernizing the country and expanded the education system. The Ministry of Education was given responsibility for regulating all public and private schools and drafted a uniform curriculum for primary and for secondary education. The entire public system was secular and for many years remained based upon the French model. Its objective was to train Iranians for modern occupations in administration, management, science, and teaching. This education system was the single most important factor in the creation of the secularized middle class.
The goal of creating a nationwide education system was never achieved during the Pahlavi era. In 1940 only 10 percent of all elementary-age children were enrolled in school, and less than 1 percent of youths between the ages of 12 and 20 were in secondary school. These statistics did not increase significantly until the early 1960s, when the government initiated programs to improve and expand the public school system. By 1978 approximately 75 percent of all elementary-age children were enrolled in primary schools, while somewhat less than 50 percent of all teenagers were attending secondary schools.
Modern college and university education also was developed under the Pahlavis; by the 1920s, the country had several institutes of higher education. In 1934 the institutes associated with government ministries were combined to form the University of Tehran, which was coeducational from its inception. Following World War II, universities were founded in other major cities, such as Tabriz, Esfahan, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Ahvaz. During the 1970s, these universities were expanded, and colleges and vocational institutes were set up in several cities.
One of the first measures adopted by the government after the Revolution in 1979 was the desecularization of the public school system. This was a three-pronged program that involved purging courses and textbooks believed to slander Islam and substituting courses on religion; purging teachers to ensure that only those who understood the true meaning of Islam (i.e., were not secular) remained in the schools; and regulating the behavior and dress of students.
Although the government reintroduced the study of religion into the public school curriculum from primary grades through college, it did not act to alter the basic organization of the education system. Thus, as late as the school year 1986-1987, schools had not changed significantly from the pattern prior to the Revolution. Students studied in primary schools for five years, beginning the first grade at about age seven. Then they spent three years, designated the guidance cycle, in a middle school. In this cycle, the future training of students was determined by their aptitude as demonstrated on examinations. Students were then directed into one of three kinds of four-year high schools: the academic cycle, preparing for college; the science and mathematics cycle, preparing for university programs in engineering and medicine; and the vocational technical cycle.
The Ministry of Education announced that nearly 11.5 million students were registered for elementary and secondary schools during the academic year 1986-1987. Statistics on the percentage of young people aged seven through nineteen enrolled in school have not been available since the Revolution. It is generally estimated that the percentages have remained similar to those before the Revolution: school attendance of about 78 percent of elementary-age children and less than 50 percent of secondary-age youth.
Since the Revolution, higher education has experienced significantly more drastic changes than elementary and secondary education. The university campuses became centers of conflict between students who supported a thorough desecularization of administrations, faculties, and curricula and students who wanted to retain a secular system. There were violent clashes at several universities in the 1979-1980 school year; as a result the government closed all 200 institutes of higher learning in April 1980. The universities then were purged of professors and students considered insufficiently Islamic and were not completely reopened until the fall of 1983. When the colleges resumed classes, they enrolled only a fraction of the 1979 to 1980 student body. At the University of Tehran, Iran's largest, student enrollment was reduced from 17,000 to 4,500; similarly large declines were registered at other institutions. The decline in the number of female students was even more dramatic: whereas on the eve of the revolution women had constituted about 40 percent of the total number of students in higher education, after 1983 they formed only 10 percent.
An educational problem in Iran since the early twentieth century has been the general perception among the upper and middle classes that foreign education is superior to Iranian. Thus, there have been large numbers of Iranians studying abroad. As long as the foreign-educated students returned to Iran, they were able to apply their skills for the overall benefit of the country; however, under both the monarchy and the Republic, thousands of Iranians have elected not to return to their homeland, creating a veritable "brain drain." Since the Revolution, the government has tried to discourage Iranians from going abroad to study, although it has not prevented the practice.
HEALTH AND WELFARE
A worker sprays to rid area of mosquitoes during a malaria-eradication campaign
Medical Personnel and Facilities
According to the Iranian Medical Association (IMA), in 1986 there were 12,300 physicians and 1,700 dentists in Iran. Medical support personnel of all kinds were in short supply, with the total number of nurses estimated at around 7,000. There were about 550 hospitals throughout the country, with a total of 62,100 beds.
The regional distribution of medical personnel was uneven. The ratio of patients to physicians in 1986 averaged more than 1,000 to 1 for Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan, and Shiraz; more than 2,000 to 1 in all other large cities (with more than 100,000 in population); and more than 4,500 to 1 elsewhere. An estimated 70 percent of all specialists practiced in Tehran.
Even before the Revolution there was a high rate of emigration of physicians, most of whom settled in the United States. In March 1976 when there were 12,196 physicians practicing in Iran, there were an estimated 10,000 other Iranian physicians practicing abroad. During the revolution there was a major exodus of physicians; the IMA has estimated that about 7,000--40 percent of the total--have left the country since the Revolution, contributing to a severe shortage.
The Islamic Republic has sought to increase the number of all medical personnel and to expand medical facilities. Health clinics and dispensaries have been constructed in lower income neighborhoods of the large cities, in small towns, and in villages. The medical schools at Tehran and Shiraz universities have developed programs for training paramedical personnel, and more students have been admitted to medical schools. Nevertheless, the facilities for training physicians remained inadequate, and fewer than 750 doctors were graduated from medical schools between 1980 and 1986. The IMA has said that Iran needs a total of at least 50,000 physicians to provide the whole population with minimally adequate health care.
Health Hazards and Preventive Medicine
During the 1970s, apart from a high infant mortality rate, the chief causes of death were gastrointestinal, respiratory, and parasitic diseases. The incidence of cancer, diabetes, and heart disease was increasing. Several contagious diseases, such as grippe and influenza, conjunctivitis, scarlet fever, whooping cough, pulmonary tuberculosis, and typhoid fever were common. There is no evidence that the incidence of these diseases or the major causes of mortality have declined during the 1980s.
Drug addiction was a serious problem before the Revolution and reportedly has worsened since 1979. The Ministry of Health estimated in 1986 that there may have been as many as 1 million addicts in the country. Opium is the most commonly used drug. Since the end of the nineteenth century, opium has been smoked as a recreational drug at social gatherings. The Shia clergy have tried to discourage this practice by declaring the use of opium religiously prohibited. There is also some heroin use in the country.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Ministry of Health carried out vaccination campaigns in both urban and rural areas. Periodic campaigns have included immunizations against measles, tuberculosis, diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, and poliomyelitis for infants and children, and general vaccinations against smallpox and cholera. These campaigns have prevented the outbreak of major epidemics.
Water Supply and Sanitation
In the mid-1980s, polluted water supplies remained one of the main reasons for the high incidence of parasitic and gastrointestinal diseases. Tehran and other large cities had chlorinated water systems, but contaminated water has continued to be a major problem in the smaller towns and villages. The disposal of waste also remained unsatisfactory. Tehran in 1986 still did not have a sewage system serving the entire city. Most of the other cities had only partial sewage systems, and in small towns and villages there were none at all.
Welfare
Religious and social traditions profoundly influence attitudes toward welfare. There is a general belief that fate determines living conditions, but most Iranians feel an obligation to help the needy in accordance with religious tenets. This idea has been reinforced since the Revolution by the persistent exhortations of the clergy to help the poorest people in society, the mostazafin. The giving of alms (zakat) is one of the mandatory obligations of the Islamic faith. As a consequence, donors of real property and monetary bequests are anxious that their names be attached to their gifts. Charitable donations may be distributed at any time, but Friday, the day of congregational prayers, is regarded as a particularly appropriate day, and even those of modest means regularly distribute food to the poor.
There is a long history in Iran of wealthy individuals' bequeathing part of their estates in the form of perpetual endowments, vaqfs, for a specified charitable purpose (see Religious Institutions and Organizations , this ch.). The last dynasty established the Pahlavi Foundation, which funded programs ranging from low-cost housing projects to the preservation of national relics. After the Revolution, the government took over administration of the Pahlavi Foundation and renamed it the Foundation for the Disinherited (Bonyad-e Mostazafin). Some of its former programs, such as granting scholarships and operating cooperatives, have been continued, but others were redesigned or dropped entirely in favor of new projects that are in accord with religious ideology.
Government-funded social insurance programs have not been as important as the private vaqfs. The first workers in the country to benefit from a public retirement program were government employees. Legislation during the 1960s and 1970s provided for the extension of social security benefits to broader categories of employees, but by the time of the Revolution less than 10 percent of the total work force was actually covered by social security. The government of the Islamic Republic has said that extending coverage to all employed persons is one of its priorities, but as of 1986 no information was available about what measures may have been adopted to extend coverage.
The first public housing projects were built in the 1960s in the southern part of Tehran. These were developments of small, single- family homes that were sold to the occupants at subsidized cost over several years. Public housing projects expanded to other cities during the 1970s. After the Revolution, the Republic continued to budget funds for the construction of low-cost public housing, although prior to 1985 its efforts in this area focused primarily on the provision of interest-free, long-term loans to encourage private construction on public land.
Since 1985 the government has built low-cost public housing, particularly in Tehran and in large cities that suffered considerable damage during the war, such as Ahvaz and Dezful. Priority for such housing has been given to widows of men killed during the war.
This housing is an example of the kind of social program that the revolutionary regime felt ideologically committed to provide as a way of assisting the less fortunate, the mostazafin. Other examples of concern for the poorer elements of society were the construction of elementary schools, bathhouses, and health clinics in villages and low- income urban areas and the emphasis on religious charitable giving to the disadvantaged. This concern for the deprived members of society was a traditional element of Islam that had been neglected to a considerable degree under the shah but which was being emphasized by the revolutionary government.
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The most complete analysis of Iranian society prior to the Revolution is Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian. Roots of Revolution by Nikki R. Keddie is an excellent study of the cultural tensions between the secularized middle and upper classes and the religiously oriented bazaar class, and it examines the relationship of this social conflict to the Revolution. The background of Shia clerical opposition to secular state policies is thoroughly examined in Shahrough Akhavi's Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran. The most detailed study of social class divisions is Iran: Dictatorship and Development by Fred Halliday. A detailed analysis of several important policies implemented during the early years of the Republic is The Reign of the Ayatollahs by Shaul Bakhash. A fascinating fictionalized account of how the secularized classes have reacted to the Islamic Republic is Sorraya in a Coma by Ismail Fassih. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1987
Source: The Library of Congress Country Studies
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